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"A Task of No Common Magnitude": The Founding
of the American Law Institute
William P. LaPiana*
In February 1923 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote to Harold
Laski:
Some of the virtuous under the call of E[lihu] Root and William
Draper Lewis meet here [in Washington] next week to talk of re-
statement of the law (I believe) .... I will try to [look in on them]
but I will take no hand and won't believe till they produce the
goods. You can't evoke genius by announcing a corpus juris.1
Fortunately for the American Law Institute few leading lawyers shared
Justice Holmes' skepticism. Over three hundred lawyers, judges, and
law teachers did meet in Washington on February 23, 1923, and enthu-
siastically created the Institute which did indeed concern itself primar-
ily with the collection, arrangement, and restatement of the most im-
portant principles of American case law. That meeting and the
resulting institution were the outgrowth of forces which had been work-
ing for legal reform throughout the preceding two decades. This essay
will trace those forces and try to show how their interplay culminated
in the meeting of February 23, 1923.
I
According to Max Rheinstein, three basic problems have domi-
nated the thinking of American jurists: adaptation of the common law
to the circumstances of the New World; endowing with specific content
the broad prescriptions of the federal Constitution and the adaptation
of those prescriptions to changing social conditions; and the preserva-
tion of the unity of the common law in the face of the multiplicity of
* Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. A.B., 1973,
A.M., 1975, J.D., 1978, Harvard. I would like to thank my colleagues John Burjoff and
Anita Allen for their help and encouragement.
1. HOLMES-LASKI LETTERs: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES
AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916-1935 at 482 (H. Howe ed. 1953).
Nova Law Review
jurisdictions. 2 To these William Twining has added two more: "mod-
ernization of the law in the wake of the industrial and technological
revolution that swept the United States in the period after 1870," and
"simplification of the sources of law, as the legal profession and the
courts became more and more swamped by the prodigious output of
legislation, regulations and reported cases." 3
A concern with these problems, however, does not necessarily lead
to an active interest in legal reform. In its everyday workings the An-
glo-American legal system undergoes constant change. Each decision of
the appellate court is a potential modification of the law, however
slight.4 Over time these gradual changes can lead to important changes
in legal rules. Especially in the eyes of those for whom conservatism is
a virtue, one of the glories of the common law system is its ability to
accommodate change without the need for sudden and wholesale
innovation.
The concept of legal reform, on the other hand, evokes a much
more rapid process, an imposition of a scheme thought out in advance
on the organic development of the common law. Not surprisingly, in
the Anglo-American system reform often involves legislation which is
the antithesis of court-made law. The great medieval statutes-Quia
emptores, the Statute of Uses, the Assize of Novel Disseisin-were all
rather radical modifications of the customary law.5 In the ante-bellum
United States legislative reform of common-law pleading and the adop-
tion of collections of revised statutes in many of the states represent the
same sort of legal reform pressed into service to accomplish the Ameri-
can ends described by Rheinstein and Twining.6
As Twining points out, however, the conditions of material life in
the United States changed rapidly and drastically after 1870 and
brought new challenges to the law as well, of course, as to other areas
2. Rheinstein, Obituary of Karl Llewellyn, 27 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR Aus-
LANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 601-05 (1962).
3. W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
4. For discussions of representative examples of legal change see McCurdy, Jus-
tice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters
of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 41 J. OF AM. His. 970 (1975);
Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in
the State Courts, 5 PERSPECTIVE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 329 (1971).
5. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 30-31, 320-22,
359-60, 585-90 (5th ed. 1956).
6. C. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBEL-
LUM LEGAL REFORM 166-81, 185-95 (1981).
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of society.7 Not surprisingly, these changes helped to bring out new
structures which were transformed by technological and industrial
change. They also, however, transformed the way in which actors on
the American legal scene thought about legal reform.
The influence of industrial and technological change was indirect.
First, certain aspects of law appeared to be out of step with the reality
of the new world of industry in which more and more Americans la-
bored. Second, changes in social structure accompanying changes in
material life challenged the self-image of the legal profession in ways
which helped to shape the sort of legal reform the profession sponsored
in an attempt to respond to the perceived dichotomy between social
reality and law.
The changes in American life brought about by the innovations
Twining mentioned did not, of course, go unnoticed by those who lived
through them. The facts of daily life had indeed changed and many
self-conscious attempts were made to bring American society and gov-
ernment into line with the changed material conditions of life. While
the history of these attempts at change cannot be neatly summarized in
a phrase, it is convenient to refer to the Progressive era and the Pro-
gressive movement, and to describe this as the "age of reform." And it
is equally convenient to accept as a starting point the assertion that the
legal system and the legal profession were to a great degree out of step
with the progressive elements of society because they appeared to be
obstacles to the most broadly accepted goal of Progressivism, social
justice.
Part of the quest for social justice in the Progressive era involved
improving the lot of laboring men and women. Much of this melioristic
desire found expression in state statutes limiting the hours of work, im-
proving working conditions, requiring payment of wages in currency
rather than in script, and in the creation of workmen's compensation
schemes. Such laws did involve redistributing some of the wealth of
society, although they stopped far short of creating a socialistic system.
They nonetheless met severe opposition and had no more dedicated op-
ponents than some of the judges of the appellate courts who invalidated
many of these laws in the name of freedom of contract.
The growth of the doctrine of freedom of contract and its incorpo-
ration through the fourteenth amendment into the corpus of liberties
which is the possession of every American is itself a history of legal
7. TWINING, supra note 3.
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change. The story culminates in the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Lochner v. New York.8 The case involved a New York stat-
ute which ordered that "No employee shall be required or permitted to
work in a biscuit, bread or cake bakery or confectionary establishment
more than sixty hours in any one week, or more than ten hours in any
one day . . . ."9 Writing for a bare five member majority, Justice
Peckham held that
It is manifest to us that the limitation of the hours of labor as
provided for in this section of the statute under which the indict-
ment was found, and the plaintiff in error convicted, has no such
direct relation to and no such substantial effect upon the health of
the employee, as to justify us in regarding the section as really a
health law. It seems to us that the real object and purpose were
simply to regulate the hours of labor between the master and his
employees (all being me, sui juris), in a private business, not dan-
gerous in any degree to morals or in any real and substantive de-
gree, to the health of the employees. Under such circumstances the
freedom of master and employee to contract with each other in
relation to their employment, and in defining the same, cannot be
prohibited or interfered with, without violating the Federal
Constitution."o
Against this rather mechanical use of doctrine Oliver Wendell Holmes
hurled one of his most memorable aphorisms: "The Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.""" In
Holmes's view the case was "decided upon an economic theory which a
large part of the country does not entertain. 1 2
The Lochner case was only one of many clashes between court and
legislature. Throughout the period statutes designed to further gener-
ally Progressive reform - measures ranging from the income tax to
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to various sorts of labor legislation -
were resolutely opposed by at least some members of the bar and by
the judges of the appellate courts.'3 Whatever the reason for this diver-
8. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
9. Id. at 46 n.1.
10. Id. at 64.
11. Id. at 75; for a discussion of Holmes's brief dissent, see M. WHITE, SOCIAL
THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 103-06 (rev. ed. 1957).
12. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75.
13. A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR
AND BENCH, 1887-1895 at 19-38, 221-37 (rev. ed. 1969); for a thorough examination
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gence between the two institutional sources of law in the American ver-
sion of the common-law system, its existence posed special problems for
the bar, which is the self-appointed guardian of American legal culture
and of the principle of justice.
The American bar seems to have taken to heart Alexis de Toc-
queville's encomiums.1 ' In the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies it was an opinion shared by few others. For many dedicated to
reform in the name of social justice the repeated failure of specific re-
forms in the courts was to be blamed on the corporation lawyer, the
demon pressing the claims of wealth on the courts to the detriment of
the worker. Even those friendly to the profession saw cause for concern
in the apparent increasing subjugation of the practitioner to the corpo-
rate wealth which was his client. This was viewed as being detrimental
to the profession's traditional independence born of mastery of the in-
tricacies of the science of the law. "To an imagination of any scope,"
said Holmes in an 1897 speech which must have made some lawyers
uncomfortable, "the most far-reaching form of power is not money, it is
the command of ideas."1 5
If these developments within the profession of the law were not
disquieting enough, changes in society as a whole exacerbated the prob-
lem. The Progressive era was a time in which the concept and role of
the professional acquired new importance.1 " As social structure
changed and America became more and more a national society, mas-
tery over a politically neutral body of scientific knowledge became an
important way to make one's place in society respectable and secure.17
As practitioners of one of the oldest professions lawyers should have
fitted easily into the scheme, but the political atmosphere made their
of many of the important Supreme Court cases of the period see J. SEMONCHE, CHAR-
TERING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS To A CHANGING SOCIETY
1890-1920 (1978).
14. "The special information that lawyers derive from their studies ensures them
a separate rank in society, and they constitute a sort of privileged body in the scale of
intellect." I A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 283-90 (Bradley ed. 1945).
15. Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 201 (1920); see
also R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN To F.D.R. 156-63 (1955).
16. See generally R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920 at 113-21
(1967); B. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA 80-120 (1976); P. STARR, THE
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 140-42 (1982).




claims to scientific neutrality appear hypocritical. To complicate mat-
ters more, the new profession of law teaching had arisen, claiming a
more perfect grasp of the science of the law.' 8 As "keepers of the pro-
fessional conscience" they only drew more attention to the practition-
ers' dilemma.' 9
.Out of this tangle of conflict and confusion came proposals for re-
form, for change swifter and more directed than the slow development
of judge-made law. This essay will trace the proposals presented by the
legal profession itself (both practitioners and teachers), principally as
expressed through the American Bar Association and the Association
of American Law Schools. 20 Each of the four major plans for change
- codification and classification, procedural modernization, reorgani-
zation of the courts, and a new jurisprudence - drew on the history of
thought about American law. The patterns of advocacy and of opposi-
tion show how the strands of historical experience were rewoven into a
new pattern in the face of the rapid changes of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. The story of this give and take, culminating
in the founding of the American Law Institute, illustrates the strongest
influence on the process of reconsideration - the desire to solidify the
place of the legal expert in a changing society.
II
Of the four basic approaches to legal reform evident in the Pro-
gressive era, the most venerable sought salvation in the codification of
the common law. The goal of codification is to reduce the mass of law
contained in the decisions to a relatively few simple, clear propositions
which could be assembled into a code and enacted into law. The legis-
lature rather than the courts establishes the ground rules.
The battle over codification is one of the most familiar episodes in
American legal history and also one of the least thoroughly understood.
Its roots go back into the late eighteenth century and are firmly
anchored in the bedrock of hostility to lawyers. Hostility to the profes-
sion was linked to hostility to all things English, including, of course,
18. Auerbach, Enmity and Amity: Law Teachers and Practitioners, 1900-1922,
5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 555 (1971).
19. HOFSTADTER, supra note 15.
20. On the usefulness of studying the ABA, and by implication the AALS, in an
attempt to answer the kinds of questions that are posed in this essay, see Auerbach,
supra note 18, at 564 n.42.
1090 [Vol. 11
The American Law Institute
the common law. 2'
The theme of opposition to English ways was prominent in the
more extreme rhetorical manifestations of support for codification, es-
pecially William Sampson's 1824 address to the New-York Historical
Society and Robert Rantoul, Jr.'s "Oration at Scituate" of 1836.22
Both men heaped well-deserved scorn on the supposed history of the
common law which portrayed it as the legatee of pure Saxon ideas of
liberty. Both used irony to great and no doubt irritating effect. And
both firmly believed that the only law fit for America was written law,
embodied in a code adopted by the legislature. For Sampson, however,
the production of such a code was the province of learned lawyers.
Rantoul placed his faith in the elected representatives of the people and
belittled the supposedly disinterested pursuit of legal truth by a profes-
sion which was merely one more selfish interest opposed to the public
good.
These differences between the two men were surely due at least in
part to the changing pattern of American politics. Sampson wrote just
before the era of Jacksonian democracy; Rantoul was a prominent
Democratic politician in Whig-dominated Massachusetts. They shared,
however, a certain scorn for things English; Sampson also exhibited a
reverence for the French legal experience, especially the Code
Napoleon.23
Not all support for codification, however, came from outside the
mainstream of the profession. In 1837, Joseph Story, the greatest legal
scientist of the day, proposed in a report to the Massachusetts legisla-
ture a limited sort of codification encompassing not the entire common
law but rather the criminal law and the law of evidence. In addition,
Story suggested that in the field of substantive civil law there would be
a codification of
those principles, and details.., which are of daily use and familiar
application to the common business of life, and the present state of
property and personal rights and contracts, and which are now so
far ascertained and established, as to admit of a scientific form and
arrangement, and are capable of being announced in distinct and
21. For a general treatment see M. BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A
CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876 at 32-58 (1976).
22. Samson's and Rantoul's s'eeches are both most easily consulted in P.
MILLER, THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA, FROM INDEPENDENCE TO CIVIL WAR 119-34,
220-28 (1962).




In spite of the stature of its author, Story's report did not mark a
new stage in an ongoing national debate. Both before and after the
issuance of the 1837 report, codification of statute law in several states
and a growing number of treatises on various areas of law (some of the
most important of which were written by Story himself) seemed to
defuse the drive for codification of the common law.25 An exception,
however, was the situation in New York, where the year 1848 saw the
most spectacular example of codification up to that time. In that year
the New York legislature adopted a code of procedure that radically
changed the law governing the mechanics of carrying on law suits in
the state and thereby swept away a vast amount of common law learn-
ing. The Field Code, named after its principal author, became the most
important symbol of codification in America.26
It is an understatement to call David Dudley Field (1805-1894)
the chief proponent of the procedural code which came to bear his
name. Starting in the 1830s he was a persistent advocate for legal
change. Nor did he rest with the passage of the code of procedure.
Until his death he remained perhaps the most prominent advocate in
the American legal profession of codification of both procedural and
substantive law, domestic and international. He was also one of the
most prominent practitioners in the City of New York, famous, or no-
torious, depending on the observer's point of view, for representing
some of the most flamboyant characters of the age, including Jay
Gould and Boss Tweed. He was nothing if not controversial and
persistent.
His opponents, led by James C. Carter, were deeply fearful of
clumsy legislative interference with the orderly development of the
common law. Judges were superior law makers who could be depended
on to mold the law according to the needs of the time; a code would
24. Story, Codification of the Common Law, in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS
OF JOSEPH STORY 715 (W. Story ed., rept ed. N.Y. 1972) (1st ed. Boston 1852); J.
MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 92-98 (1971).
25. C. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBEL-
LUM LEGAL REFORM 158-81 (1981).
26. Reppy, The Field Codification Concept, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: CENTE-
NARY ESSAYS 32, 34-35 (A. Reppy ed. 1949).
27. For a brief exposition of Field's role see Pound, David Dudley Field: An
Appraisal, in id. at 3-16.
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freeze it into sterility. 28 Underneath their disagreements, however,
Field and Carter shared certain assumptions: "They both valued flexi-
bility in the law; liked a businesslike rationality; distrusted the role of
non-experts, of laymen, in the making of law."' 29 Unlike the antebellum
disputes over codification, however, the debates between Field and
Carter and their respective supporters found an audience made up al-
most exclusively of legal professionals.
In light of the emphasis both sides gave to expertise, it is not sur-
prising that the problem of codification came before the American Bar
Association. Founded in 1878 in Saratoga Springs by a few dozen
wealthy lawyers, the ABA spent most of its first few years providing an
added dimension to the summer vacations of its members. It was, how-
ever, representative of the concerns of a segment of the elite of the
profession, which was deeply concerned with promoting "safe, con-
servative reform" in the face of the demands for innovation and change
which reflected the changing conditions of material life in late nine-
teenth century America.30 After an address on the subject in 1884 by
Judge John F. Dillon, the Association decided that one of the defects of
the legal system which could be safely and conservatively reformed by
lawyers was delay and uncertainty in judicial administration. In 1885
and 1886 the Association had before it lengthy reports on the problem.
Both reports were authored by committees in which David Dudley
Field and Dillon were the moving forces.3 1 Not surprisingly, both docu-
ments called for codification as a solution. After much debate32 the
ABA did approve by a vote of fifty-eight to forty-one a resolution
which, in terms reminiscent of Story, called for the reduction of the law
"so far as its substantive principles are settled, to the form of a stat-
ute," but the sound and fury of debate seem to have exhausted the
interest of the Association in the subject.33
28. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 403-04 (2d ed. 1985).
29. Id. at 405.
30. Id. at 650-51; Matzko, The Best Men of the Bar: The Founding of the
American Bar Association, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR
AMERICA 75-76, 89 (G. Gewalt ed. 1984).
31. Special Committee on Delay and Uncertainty in Judicial Administration,
Report, 8 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 323, 323-449 (1885); Special Committee on Delay
and Uncertainty in Judicial Administration, 9 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 325, 325-502
(1886).
32. 8 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 46-62, 67-83 (1885); 9 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A.
11-74 (1886).
33. 9 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 74 (1886); see also Yntema, The American Law
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A facet of the codification movement lived on in the Association,
however, and indeed in the larger arena of legal reform. One of the
assumptions underlying the theory of codification is the idea "that legal
system is best, and works best, and does the most for society, which
most conforms to the idea of legal rationality - legal order which is
most clear, orderly, systematic (in its formal parts), which has the most
structural beauty, which most appeals to the modern, well-educated ju-
rist.'" 4 The mere rearrangement of the law on the printed page in ac-
cord with an appropriate scheme of classification would effect great
good by elucidating the basic principles of the law, whether or not
those principles are put into statutory form.
The American Bar Association first took up the problem of classi-
fication in 1888 in response to a letter on the subject from Henry T.
Terry, who called for an arrangement of American law based on "ulti-
mate principles." 35 The committee formed in reponse to this appeal
made elaborate reports in 1891 and 1902 but was discontinued after
1907.36 In 1917 another committee concerned with classification was
formed, perhaps in response to Elihu Root's comments on the necessity
of a classification of American law made in his presidential address to
the ABA in 1916.1" This committee was continued until 1924, when its
aims were judged to be sufficiently provided for by the new American
Law Institute. 8
Classification was also taken up at the state level, New York being
an example. There the chairman of the Board of Statutory Consolida-
tion, Adolph J. Rodenbeck, expected great things from a classification
of the law into a gigantic outline whose headings would be formulated
Institute, 12 CAN. B. REV. 319, 327 n.26 (1934).
34. FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 407.
35. 12 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 327, 327-38 (1889). Terry was a lawyer and
scholar of sorts who spent most of the 1910's teaching at the Imperial University in
Tokyo. As late as 1924 he was corresponding with Roscoe Pound on the problem of
classification and proposed an elaborate system which Pound found much too depen-
dent on Austin. Letter from Roscoe Pound to William Draper Lewis, June 24, 1924,
Paige Box 32, Roscoe Pound Papers, Harvard Law School Library, Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts [hereinafter Pound MSS].
36. Committee on Classification of the Law, Report, 14 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A.
379, 397-408 (1891); Committee on Clarification of the Law, 25 REPORTS OF THE
A.B.A. 425, 425-75 (1902); Yntema, supra note 33, at 327 n.26.
37. Root, Public Service by the Bar, 41 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 355, 365-66
(1916).
38. Committee on Clarification and Re-statement of the Law, 49 REPORTS OF
THE A.B.A. 39-40 (1924).
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according to the principles of logic enunciated by Archbishop Richard
Whately, nineteenth-century English cleric and author of a widely-read
treatise first published in 1823.11 The thrust of all these efforts was well
summarized by the ABA committee in 1920: "The elements here re-
ferred to, involve carrying to the lawyers a comprehension and under-
standing of fundamental legal principles and by classification showing
that these principles form a thread or clue through and to the mass of
decisions."' "
Clearly, the idea of classification had a much fuller play than the
idea of codification, in part because it did not evoke the overheated
emotions that the Field-Carter controversy lent to all discussions of the
latter. It also had a more distinguished and less controversial lineage. It
was the vigorous contemporary representative of a notion of legal sci-
ence which completely dominated American legal thought before the
Civil War when the very idea of science reflected the overwhelming
prestige accorded the thought of Francis Bacon.
Allegiance to "Baconianism" was a mark of scientific orthodoxy in
antebellum America. While the orthodox did not all adhere to a single
version of the creed, in general Baconianism meant empiricism, the
avoidance of hypotheses, a belief that careful observation of the mate-
rial world and proper classification of the facts observed would allow
the induction of the principles underlying the processes of nature. This
would reveal, ultimately, the very mind of God.41
This model of science could easily encompass the common law.
What are individual cases but the data to be observed? What is to be
drawn from an observation of all cases but legal principles the ordering
of which will lead to rational understanding of the legal universe? It
was the primary tool of lawyers like Story; these lawyers, Perry Miller
chronicled, attempted to construct and maintain the temple of law in
the face of opposition based on the popular and democratic strains in
American thought. 2
39. See A. RODENBECK, THE CLASSIFICATION AND RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
8-11 (1919).
40. Special Committee on Classification and Restatement of the Law, Report, 6
A.B.A. J. 420, 424 (1920).
41. G. DANIELS, AMERICAN SCIENCE IN THE AGE OF JACKSON 65 (1968); T.
BOZEMAN, PROTESTANTISM IN AN AGE OF SCIENCE: THE BACONIAN IDEA AND ANTE-
BELLUM RELIGIOUS THOUGHT 23-30 (1977).
42. P. MILLER, LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CIVIL WAR 99-265 (1965). For typical examples of the invocation of Bacon by antebel-
lum legal thinkers see 2 J. WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONORABLE JAMES WILSON,
1987] 1095
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The idea of legal science survived the Civil War and helped to
inform the thought of, among others, Christopher Columbus Langdell
who as the first dean of Harvard Law School made all things new in
American legal education. His definition of legal science, found in the
preface to his first casebook, the 1871 A Selection of Cases on the Law
of Contracts, illustrates both the premises of the classifiers and what
they hoped to accomplish:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doc-
trines .... Moreover the number of fundamental doctrines is much
less than is commonly supposed; the many different guises in which
the same doctrine is constantly making its appearance, and the
great extent to which legal treatises are a repetition of each other,
being the cause of much misapprehension. If these doctrines could
be so classified and arranged that each should be found in its
proper place, and nowhere else, they would cease to be formidable
L.L.D. 43-44 (1804); D. MAYES, AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE TRUSTEES AND
FACULTY OF TRANSYLVANIA UNIVERSITY AT THE OPENING OF THE SESSION OF THE
LAW DEPARTMENT ON THE 7TH Nov. 1831 at 16 (1831); AN INTRODUCTORY LECTURE
DELIVERED TO THE LAW CLASS OF TRANSYLVANIA UNIVERSITY ON THE 5 OF NOVEM-
BER 1832 at 7, 17 (1832); J. GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN
CIVIL ACTIONS xiii (F. Heard ed. 4th ed. 1887) (1st ed. 1832); Kent, The Rise and
Progress of Commercial Law in English Jurisprudence, in INAGURAL ADDRESSES, DE-
LIVERED BY THE PROFESSORS OF LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY OF THE CITY OF NEW-YORK,
AT THE OPENING OF THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE INSTITUTION 49 (1838); Notes of Pro-
fessor Greenleafis Introductory Lecture, At the Present Term, 1 THE L. REP. 218
(1838) (a reprint of the "Notes" in the Harvard Law School Library Treasure Room
bears in Greenleaf's hand the inscription "with the respects of S. Greenleaf" and in
another hand the notation "Gift of Prest. Quincy." Greenleaf no doubt considered the
"Notes" to be at least an accurate summary of his views.); F. LIEBER, LEGAL AND
POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 80-81 (rpt. 1970) (1st ed. 1839); Ingrham, An Address De-
livered before the Law Academy of Philadelphia, at the Opening of the Session of
1828-1829, 12 HAZARD'S REGISTER OF PA. 323, 326 (1833); Hopkinson, An Address
Delivered before the Law Academy of Philadelphia at the Opening of the Session of
1826-1827, 12 HAZARD'S REGISTER OF PA. 289, 290 (1833); Sergeant, A Lecture De-
livered before the Law Academy of Philadelphia, on Tuesday Evening, November 28,
1843, 3 PA. L.J. 93, 97; Rawle, A Discourse on the Nature and Study of Law, 14
HAZARD'S REGISTER OF PA. 181, 182 (1834); J. WILLARD, ADDRESS To THE MEMBERS
OF THE BAR OF WORCESTER COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS, OCTOBER 2, 1829 at 113
(1830); Story, Developments of Science and Mechanic Art [1829], in THE MISCELLA-
NEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 479 (W. Story ed., rpt. 1972) (1st ed. 1852);
Story, Characteristics of the Age [1826], in id. at 350-51; for further praise of Bacon
see Progress of Jurisprudence [1821], in id. at 207.
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from their number.4 3
Although the law schools would eventually move beyond this taxonomic
ideal, as incarnated in the classifiers it would play an important role in
the founding of the American Law Institute."
Whatever the differences among them, the promoters of codifica-
tion and classification met the challenge of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries with proposals going to the basic cause of all
problems. Once properly codified or at least classified, the law would
never again be out of step with society. Other proponents of reform had
far more modest goals. While they often spoke the language of clarifi-
cation of the law, simplification of the practitioner's task, and the aboli-
tion of anachronisms, they turned their attention not to the substantive
law but to procedure, the adjective law which governs the mechanics of
an action before the court. These mechanics can be summarized by a
timetable which indicates when papers are to be filed and a list of rules
which dictate what must be in the papers if the desired relief is to be
obtained. Problems begin when the rules become complex and rigid.
The smallest mistakes can then result in the dismissal of an action or in
a decision which may be contrary to clear principles of justice. Com-
plex rules can also provide rich raw material from which lawyers who
are so inclined can fashion delay and obfuscation.45
Not surprisingly, therefore, when dissatisfaction with the legal sys-
tem includes complaints about the law's delay, the defeat of justice by
technicality, and the mystification of the law, relief is often sought
through procedural reform. The Progressive era was just such a period,
although surely not the first. Field's code of civil procedure was meant
to answer such complaints. Its principal feature was the abolition of the
distinction between law and equity and the creation of a single form of
action through which an aggrieved private party could obtain whatever
43. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS Vii
(1871).
44. For discussions of the concept of law as science in the period under consider-
ation, see Yntema, supra note 33, at 320-22; TWINING, supra note 3, at 12; S. Yeazell,
The Ideology of Legal Method 1880-1925, at 9-13 (unpublished seminar paper,
Harvard Law School, 1974).
45. On the complexity of procedure and pleading under the unreformed common
law see FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 126-34; J. REID, CHIEF JUSTICE: THE JUDICIAL
WORLD OF CHARLES DOE 93-96 (1967); W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COM-




sort of relief was appropriate, be it the money damages of the common
law courts or the more flexible remedies of the equity tradition. This
was a revolutionary change: It meant the end of all special pleading,
forms of actions and writs, and the closing of the chasm between equity
and law-the destruction at one blow of "the paraphernalia of this
most recondite, most precious, most lawyerly area of law."' 46 The Field
Code was not a success in New York, perhaps because of its revolution-
ary nature.47 Nonetheless, the Code had some success in the newer
states of the West and even in England. 48 It was not the only force for
procedural reform, however. In the 1880's and 1890's Chief Justice
Charles Doe of New Hampshire was able to radically simplify the civil
procedure of his state, although his success was prefaced by twenty
years of struggle. What the Field Code established by statute, and
more, Doe did by judicial decision. Indeed, he was credited with saving
New Hampshire from the problems of code practice.49
In short, the reform of procedure is supposed to promote efficiency
and economy in the courts through the alteration of the most craft ori-
ented segment of the lawyer's work. Procedural reform is thus excellent
professional reform. It is politically neutral, having no object except the
common good. It emphasizes the technical and scientific, the most ab-
struse portion of the lawyer's work, something which is his alone. "The
fact is that technical law reform, whether or not it fills any general
social needs, fills an important need of the profession; and in this lies
its magic. ' 50 In a time of crisis of professional identity, like the Pro-
gressive era, a turn to procedural reform should be expected. Such an
expectation is not disappointed. The movement to reform civil proce-
dure was one of the most widely supported legal reforms of the
period.51
46. FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 392.
47. Friedman maintains, however, that "[t]he real vice of the code probably lay
in its weak empirical base." Id. at 394.
48. Id. at 394-97; C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 29-31
(2nd ed. 1947); R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 52-57 (1952).
49. REID, supra note 45, at 93-108
50. Friedman, Law Reform in Historical Perspective, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351,
357 (1969).
51. This statement rests on an examination of the Green Bag, Case and Com-
ment, Bench and Bar, and the Central Bar Journal for the period 1906-1920. These
periodicals were not university law reviews but commercial publications. Presumably
they had to publish more material of current interest than a law review did and they all
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The third strain of legal reform evident during the Progressive era
was also concerned with efficiency and economy but turned its attention
to the courts, which were governed by the procedural rules as well as to
the rules themselves. The most prominent advocate of the reorganiza-
tion of the courts was the American Judicature Society, founded in
1913. Concentrating on efficient and expert administration, especially
as applied to urban areas, the AJS fits the traditional conception of
Progressive reform very nicely.
The Judicature Society spent its first seven years drafting model
court administration statutes both for states and metropolitan areas.
While the Society's materials provided alternative systems to suit local
needs, the favored model for a state-wide system featured a unified
General Court of Judicature, an elected chief justice who appointed the
judges of the lower divisions of the unified court, and elected county
judges. The model municipal court also featured an elected chief jus-
tice who appointed his associates who sat in functionally distinct divi-
sions - appellate, chancery, domestic relations, civil jury, and civil
non-jury - in whose peculiarities they should become expert. In both
cases the chief justice was to be responsible for the organization and
efficiency of both the judicial and administrative sides of the court and
answerable for his performance at the polls. 2
The American Judicature Society itself claimed that its plans were
simply "the short ballot and the commission form of government ap-
plied to the judiciary and to the administration of justice by the
courts. '53 The Judicature Society was thus in tune with the main line
of Progressive urban reform. One of its most prominent members, Al-
bert Kales, advocated the short ballot and the commission not only on
the urban but also on the state level.M The Society's secretary, Robert
devoted considerable space to procedural reform. Examination of the classified bibliog-
raphy in Case and Comment from 1910 to 1917 shows sixty-one articles on procedural
reform appearing in various legal publications. An idea of the geographical dispersion
of the movement can also be obtained from an examination of the letters in the Pound
MSS, supra note 35. One of the leaders of the movement, Pound received requests for
help from reformers in Illinois, Washington, Missouri, Texas, the District of Columbia,
Ohio, and California.
52. First Draft of a State-Wide Judicature Act, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCI-
ETY BULLETIN VII passim (1914); First Draft of an Act to Establish a Model Court
for a Metropolitan District, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY BULLETIN IV passim
(1914).
53. Id. at 4.
54. A. KALES, UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 170 (1914).
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Harley, expected to "sail to glory with the short ballot and the commis-
sion-manager form of government" and illustrated the need for the re-
forms advocated by the group with a revealing metaphor: "[One could]
as well conceive of a department store being successfully run without a
manager as to conceive of the manifold duties involved in administering
justice in the modern city accomplished by the mere voluntary acts of
unorganized judges." 55
Such an examination of administration, of "proper procedures and
continuous enforcement rather than . . . simple self-fulling rules,' 56 is
characteristic of the Progressive era. On the other hand, the reformers
of procedure and of classification approached reform in a way more
characteristic of the nineteenth century. They expected great results
from fairly simple changes.5 Thomas Shelton, chairman of the ABA's
Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, believed a grant by Con-
gress to the Supreme Court of the power to write the procedural rules
for the law side of the federal courts would create "a new era of scien-
tific judicial relations" in which lay criticism would be answered by
"instant relief' for procedural inequities, a complete reorganization of
the courts would be effected, and "an equitable division of power and
duty between the legislative and judicial departments of government"
would result.5 8 Rodenbeck saw great benefits from the classification of
the law since "the very lack of scientific interest and study of the law in
the profession. . has caused the law to be looked upon and treated by
many, not as a science but as a livelihood." 59 By putting one bill
through Congress and reducing the law to an outline, Shelton and
Rodenbeck would have aided the professionalization of the bar, cleared
the way for scientific development of the law, and restored the proper
relationship between legislature and court.
The reformers associated with the AJS also exhibited some of the
weaknesses of Progressive reform. The most prominent was their great
faith in norms established by psychological testing. John H. Wigmore,
55. Harley, Court Organization for a Metropolitan District, 9 AM. POL. ScI.
REV. 518 (1915); see also Harley, Business Management for the Courts, 5 VA. L. REV.
1, 21 (1917).
56. R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 at 154 (1967).
57. Id. at 62 and generally at 11-75; E. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY:
A HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN REFORM 9-23 (rev. ed. 1955); HOFSTADTER, supra
note 15, at 131-48.
58. Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, Report, 6 A.B.A. J. 507, 513-16
(1920).
59. RODENBECK, supra note 39, at 8.
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dean of the Law School at Northwestern University and a leader of the
Society, returned from his service in the Judge Advocate General's
Corps after the First World War and announced that the time had
come to institute psychiatric examinations for all criminal defendants.6 0
Apparently the poor results from psychological screening of draftees
did not diminish his faith. Robert Harley wished to see a "psychopathic
laboratory" attached to every criminal record,61 where those who could
not cope with "the fierce competition of metropolitan life" would be
identified and sent to rural colonies rather than prisons. Such people
were not criminal "but simply unable because of brain lesions to live up
to the multitudinous regulations of metropolitan society." Harley did
not believe in limiting a good thing: "We will go further, even, by test-
ing the minds of the witnesses and jurors in civil as well as criminal
cases."
6 2
The men associated with the AJS were certainly representative of
certain aspects of Progressivism. In addition, the four most prominent
- Harley, Kales, Wigmore, and Nathan William MacChesney -
were all law teachers. Their embrace of reform-oriented attitudes and
newer ways of thinking set them apart from the practitioners agitating
for procedural reform and classification through bar associations.6 3
These differences would eventually move from the intellectual sphere to
the field of political conflict.
The final mode of legal reform actively pursued in early twentieth
century America was designed to provide a jurisprudential foundation
for the other types of reform. Sociological jurisprudence was to provide
a sound theory of law and of judicial decision-making which would pre-
vent the sorts of opinions which had focused so much hostility on the
courts.
Roscoe Pound was the prophet of sociological jurisprudence in
America. His work, as he freely admitted, rested heavily on Continen-
tal, especially German, scholarship, and the extent of his own original-
ity is still an open question." Whatever his sources, however,
60. Wigmore, Some Lessons for Civilian Justice to be Learned from Military
Justice, 10 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170, 175 (1919).
61. Harley, Court Organization, supra note 55, at 516; Harley, Present Tenden-
cies in Judicial Reform, 9 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 538 (1916). Such a commitment to
norms was not always a component of progressive reform; see J. ADDAMS, DEMOCRACY
AND SOCIAL ETHICS 13-70 (A.F. Scott ed. 1964).
62. Harley, Court Organization, supra note 55, at 516.
63. Auerbach, supra note 18, at 554-58.
64. Among the sources for sociological jurisprudence Pound listed: VACCARO,
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by 1910 ... he had formulated a systematic critique of American
law. The central theme of his criticism was that the deductive
method and nineteenth century legal theory had created a closed
system of legal rules, one that enshrined ephemeral anachronisms
as fundamental principles in conscious disregard of the society that
law served. 65
The old jurisprudence was mechanical, the new would be sociological.
Pound recognized that with the new century had come a new con-
ception of justice - social justice as opposed to the older legal justice.
Society had decided to pit "the organized brains of the community
against the aggressive individual brain" in order to prevent exploitation
and oppression .6 This desire was reflected in legislation which put so-
cial interests above individual interests. Unfortunately, not only was
legislation itself scorned by the common law tradition, but the anti-
individualist notion embodied in the legislation ran contrary to the in-
tellectual outlook which dominated the courts.6 1
To counteract the obstacles to the new legislation, sociological ju-
rists insisted on six main points:
1) "Study of the actual social effects of legal institutions and le-
gal doctrines,"
2) "sociological study in connection with legal study in prepara-
tion for legislation,"
3) "study of the means of making legal rules effective,"
4) "a sociological legal history" designed "to show us how the
LES BASES SOCIOLOGIQUES Du DROIT ET DE L'ETAT (1898); VANNI, LEZIONI DI
FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO (1902, 1908); STAMMLER, WIRTHSCHAFT UND REcHT (1906);
EHRLICH, SOZIOLOGIE UND JURISPRUDENZ (1906); GRASSERIE, LES PRINCIPES SOCIO-
LOGIQUES DU DROIT CIVIL (1906); GUMPLOWIcz, ALLGEMEINES STATSRECHT (1877,
1907); DEMOGUE, LES NOTIONS FONDAMENTALES DU DROIT PRIVf (1911); DUGUIT,
LE DROIT SOCIAL, LE DROIT INDIVIDUEL ET LA TRANSFORMATION DE L'ETAT (1908,
1911); ROLIN, PROLEGOMENES A LA SCIENCE DU DROIT (1911). All are cited in Pound,
The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591, 612
(1911); see also R. POUND, LAW AND MORALS 150-53 (1924) (bibliography).
65. D. WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 161 (1974).
66. Pound, Social Justice and Legal Justice, 75 CENTRAL L.J. 459 (1912).
67. See Pound, Courts and Legislation, 7 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 361-83 (1913);
Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 383-407 (1908). Much
of what Pound wrote was repetitive. The notes to these paragraphs indicate only some
of the sources which support the statement made. For a full list of Pound's writings on
jurisprudence in this period, all of which have entered into the synthesis presented here,
see F. SETARO, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF ROSCOE POUND (1942).
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law of the past grew out of social, economic, and psychologi-
cal conditions, how it accorded with or accomodated itself to
them, and how far we can proceed upon that law as a basis, or
in disregard of it, with well-grounded expectations of produc-
ing the results desired,"
5) "the importance of reasonable and just solutions of individual
causes,"
6) all with the hope of making "effort more effective in achieving
the purposes of law."'68
In short, the sociological jurist criticizes legal systems, doctrines, and
institutions "with respect to their relation to social conditions and social
progress." '6 9
Once the sociological view of jurisprudence came to dominate legal
thinking, all that would be well for the cause of the current problem
was to be found in the intellectual realm and had nothing to do with
politics or economics. Judges made antisocial decisions because they
had antiquated ideas about law and society. They were still living in a
world in which the sole purpose of law was to free the human will and
abolish the invidious distinctions based on status.
Much in American judicial decisions with respect to master
and servant, liberty of contract, and right to pursue a lawful call-
ing, which it has been the fashion of late to refer to class bias of
judges or to purely economic influences, is in reality merely the
logical development of traditional principles of the common law by
men who if they had not been so taught, read every day in their
scientific books of the progress from status to contract and the de-
velopment of law through securing and giving effect to the human
will.70
The bench and the bar needed reeducation, and the business of
legal education belonged to the law school and its faculty. Just as
faulty law teaching was responsible for the antiquated ideas still con-
trolling the courts,7 1 so reformed teaching would train "the rising gen-
68. Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pt. 3), 25
HARV. L. REv. 489, 513-16 (1912).
69. Id.
70. Pound, Political and Economic Interpretations of Jurisprudence, 9 PROC. OF
THE AM. POL. Sc!. ASWN 100 (1912); see also Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE
L.J. 454, 454-87 (1909); Pound, Taught Law, 37 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 977 (1912).
71. Pound, Social Problems and the Courts, 18 Am. J. Soc. 339 (1912).
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eration of lawyers in a social, political and legal philosophy abreast of
our times."17 2 It was the mission of that new profession to raise up a
new generation of practitioners trained in a law appropriate to the
modern world. Pound did not underrate the importance of the task:
It is . . . the duty of American teachers of law to investigate the
sociological foundations, not of law alone, but of the common law
and of the special topics in which they give instruction, and while
teaching the actual law by which courts decide, to give to their
teaching the color which will fit new generations of lawyers to lead
the people as they should, instead of giving up their legitimate he-
gemony in legislation and politics to engineers and naturalists and
economists.73
These four suggestions for reform put forward by public-spirited
members of the profession can be linked one with the other according
to several different criteria. Classification and sociological jurispru-
dence were concerned with legal science, although one rested on old
and the other on new notions of what that was. Procedural reform and
the reform of court organization, on the other hand, were concerned
with the day-to-day operation of the courts, yet one was the darling of
academics in touch with relatively advanced social and political
thought while the other was the pet of practitioners who may have been
far more conservative. Several actors in the events leading to the found-
ing of the ALI operated across the entire field, advocating the same
reforms for different reasons. In the end, the American Law Institute
became the institutional embodiment of legal reform because it best
served the needs of the legal professionals involved in a time of change.
What those needs were and how the ALI met them is the subject of the
final part of this essay.
III
The period of most intense interaction of the four major strands of
legal reform is bounded by two important events: Roscoe Pound's
speech at the American Bar Association convention of 1906 on "The
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice"
72. Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 339, 352
(1905).
73. Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 612
(1907).
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and the founding of the American Law Institute in 1923. The configu-
rations of reform notions in the two years were quite different. In the
intervening years one strain - the classificatory - came to dominate
the others under the relentless pressure for the complete professional-
ization of the practice of law.
In 1906 Roscoe Pound was dean of the law school at the Univer-
sity of Nebraska. The recipient from Nebraska of a Ph.D. in botany, he
had studied law for only one year at Harvard before returning to Lin-
coln to practice law. By 1906, he had achieved great prominence in his
native state, having served on the commission appointed to hear cases
backed up on the docket of the state supreme court. He was at St. Paul
in August 1906 at the invitation of the president of the ABA, who had
heard him speak at the annual meeting of the Nebraska State Bar As-
sociation in 1905.74
Pound diagnosed the causes of popular dissatisfaction with the ad-
ministration of justice.7 5 He noted that American political institutions
de-emphasized bureaucratic control in favor of local government, that
all law inherently tended toward uniformity, and that it was an age of
transition from extreme individualism to a more collective outlook.
These causes, however, "will take care of themselves." "But too much
of the current dissatisfaction," Pound continued, "has a just origin in
our judicial organization and procedure. ' 76 The principal result of the
failings of judicial organization and procedure is "a deep-seated desire
to keep out of court, right or wrong, on the part of every sensible busi-
nessman in the community.""17
Pound's far from radical speech infuriated some members of the
ABA. A resolution to reprint the speech and distribute it to the mem-
bers of the Association and to a joint committee of Congress then con-
sidering a judiciary bill was met by vigorous attacks on Pound's pro-
positions. In the end the subject matter of the speech was referred to
the Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure.7 8
The following year that committee reported that Pound had not been
"iconoclastic" or "antagonistic" and urged the creation of a special
committee to "Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws to
74. D. WIGDOR, supra note 65, at 1-123.
75. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 29 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 395, 395-417 (1906).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 408-09.
78. 21 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 11, 12, 55-65 (1906).
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Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation." The committee's
recommendation was adopted and the ABA officially bent its efforts
toward procedural reform.79
During the entire period under consideration here the Special
Committee focused its attention solely on procedure in the federal
courts, leaving the state field to state bar associations. The Special
Committee was able to secure the passage of bills requiring a showing
of probable cause before the granting by the United States Supreme
Court of a writ of habeas corpus, working a limited procedural unifica-
tion of law and equity and simplifying the process for amending plead-
ings, broadening the scope of review by the United States Supreme
Court, and requiring that new trials be refused if the errors complained
of in the court below did not effect the substantial rights of the parties;
it also provided advice to the committee of the Supreme Court which
wrote the new equity rules of 1912.80
The Special Committee also published lengthy reports in 1909 and
1910 on comprehensive procedural reform. These reports, which were
the work of Pound, advocated the creation of a system of procedure by
rules of court rather than through statutory enactment. Actual imple-
mentation of this notion on the federal level was left to another com-
mittee, headed by Thomas Shelton, which worked for congressional
passage of a bill allowing the Supreme Court to make such rules for
the law side of the federal courts. Although Shelton met nothing but
frustration - Senator Thomas Walsh of Montana kept the bill bottled
up in the Judiciary Committee seemingly forever - after his death his
reform was finally adopted and resulted in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.81
As pursued by the ABA, procedural reform would fulfill important
professional aims. By removing rule-making from the legislatures it
would reinforce lawyers' claims to professional status: to the experts
belonged the making of rules for the practice of expertise.8 Improving
79. Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure, Report, 31
REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 52, 505-12 (1907).
80. Wheeler, Memorandum, 45 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 62-63 (1920).
81. Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws to
Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation, Report, 34 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A.
578, 578-609 (1909), and 35 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 614, 614-50 (1910); Committee
on Uniform Judicial Procedure, Report, 6 A.B.A. J. 509 (1920).
82. It is significant that under the most widely supported plan for procedural
reform the judges would be making the rules. For a discussion of the image of the
judge as the expression of the highest professional aspirations, see Botein, What 'We
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the mechanism for managing business in the courts would, Pound
frankly said in 1906, help preserve the profession's near monopoly of
the means of resolving commercial disputes. In spite of the allure of the
goal, the ABA's efforts for procedural reform made only slow progress,
principally because nothing could be done without the cooperation of
Congress. The classification movement, however, drew its impulse from
and was directed by the legal profession itself. The great enthusiasm
engendered was damped by the First World War before any practical
results could be seen, but it revived after the great conflict was over
and played an important part in the founding of the ALI.
The ABA first took up classification in response to Henry T.
Terry's letter of 1888. The committee then formed ceased to exist after
1907, just as procedural reform received the Association's sanction.
The lengthy 1902 report of the Committee on the Classification of the
Law expressed rather typical sentiments: "The great fundamental prin-
ciples upon which the fabric of our law rests, constitutes [sic] a system,
and it is the reverse of science to treat the expressed rules as the whole,
or as the most important part of that system."8 3 This brief statement
clearly shows the Baconian heritage of classification. The "expressed
rules," the holdings of cases, are merely illustrative of the principles
which lie behind and which really are the law.
The classificatory ideal did not disappear, however, with the de-
mise of the ABA committee. In 1910 one issue of the Green Bag, a
magazine for lawyers, was entirely devoted to the question of the crea-
tion of an American corpus juris, a gigantic classification and state-
ment of the principles of American law. The centerpiece of the presen-
tation was a long "Memorandum in re Corpus Juris" prepared by
practitioners Lucien Hugh Alexander and James De Witt Andrews and
by a distinguished teacher, George Kirchwey of Columbia. 4 The heart
of the proposal was the creation of a group of law teachers who would
write a complete statement of American law according to a scientific
scheme of classification and then submit their work to an advisory
board of practitioners, judges, and other teachers. In this way all
American law could be "completely exhibited as the product of the best
Shall Meet Afterwards in Heaven." Judgeship as a Symbol for Modern American
Lawyers, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 46-59 (G.
Geison ed. 1983).
83. Committee on the Classification of the Law, Report, 25 REPORTS OF THE
A.B.A. 425, 425-75 (1902).
84. Memorandum in re Corpus Juris, 22 GREEN BAG 59 (1910).
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thought in the profession. '"85
Both the method chosen to prepare the corpus juris and the claim
that it would be the highest accomplishment of the profession would
reappear in the discussions surrounding the founding of the ALI thir-
teen years later. In the meantime, however, the 1910 agitation seems to
have come to nothing. In 1916 the idea was revived within the ABA
once more, probably in response to Elihu Root's presidential address of
that year, "Public Service by the Bar." 6
Root's speech urged the profession to take an active part in society
to insure that the people of the United States benefitted from the best
possible administration of justice. The true spirit of the profession re-
quired such service. "Commercialization" of the bar, the attitude that
lawyering is merely "a career which affords a living without manual
labor," must be opposed through strict control over admission to the
bar and the requirement that admission be governed by the standards
of the best law schools. Preserving standards is only part of the solu-
tion, however. Even the most honorable members of the profession need
help in understanding the rapidly changing American law. Judges and
lawyers engaged in the administration of justice needed a new Ameri-
can Corpus Juris Civilis which would "carry to the great mass of them,
present and future, a comprehensive and discriminating understanding
of the legal principles which form the thread of Ariadne for guidance
through the labyrinth of decisions. '87 Yet again the understanding of
principles was the key to knowing law. Discrete cases were at best im-
perfect guides.
In 1917 the ABA created a Special Committee on the Classifica-
tion and Restatement of the Law. This Special Committee set its col-
lective mind to producing the corpus juris; one of its leaders was the
same James DeWitt Andrews of the 1910 project. Not much was ac-
complished during the War, but the committee came to life again in
1919 and from then until 1922 Andrews tried to convince the Associa-
tion that a corpus juris could be created through the dormant Ameri-
can Academy of Jurisprudence. Founded in 1914 by a group of lumi-
naries including William Howard Taft, Elihu Root, George
Wickersham, Frederick Coudert, Roscoe Pound, and Samuel Willis-
85. Id. (emphasis in original removed).
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ton,"' the Academy had the familiar aim of inquiring
into all important principles of law which at the present time are in
a confused, conflicting, and uncertain stage by reason of conflicting
judicial decisions, to the end that the sound principles of right and
justice may be discovered and such logical reasons therefore given
as will preclude as far as possible future uncertainty and discussion
and in this manner unify and clarify the law.89
The coming of the War ended the group's activities and Andrews' at-
tempt to revive it was frustrated by the coming of the ALI.
The mid-decade revival of the classification idea was not limited to
the elite practitioners represented in the ABA. In 1914 the elite law
teachers of the Association of American Law Schools heard two
speeches, one by Joseph Beale of Harvard on "The Necessity For a
Study of Legal System"'90 and the other by Wesley N. Hohfeld of Yale
on "A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law: Have American Univer-
sities Awakened to the Enlarged Opportunities and Responsibilities of
the Present Day?" ' Beale made yet another contribution to the rheto-
ric of principles, system, and science:
What, then, is the common law which is scientifically studied in the
country? It is surely a philosophical system, a body of scientific
principle which has been adopted in each of the common law juris-
dictions in this country, as the basig of its law .... But the general
scientific law remains unchanged in spite of these errors [misstate-
ments and misconceptions of the courts]; the same throughout all
common law jurisdictions. This is the science which we teach, and
this is the science which requires systematic statement in order that
progress and reform may be possible.9"
Hohfeld's paper was a detailed outline of such a systematic study.
These two speeches, together with the appointment the following year
88. 44 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 92 (1922).
89. Letter from James DeWitt Andrews to William Howard Taft, New York
City, Paige Box 26, Pound MSS, supra note 35.
90. Beale, The Necessity for a Study of Legal System, PROC. Ass'N AM. L.
SCHOOLS 348 (1914).
91. Hohfeld, A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law: Have American Univer-
sities Awakened to the Enlarged Opportunities and Responsibilities of the Present
Day?, 14 PROc. Ass'N Am. L. SCHOOLS 76-139 (1914).
92. Beale, supra note 90.
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of a committee to investigate the establishment of a center for jurispru-
dence, were selected by the Director of the ALI as the starting point
for his brief official history of the Institute.93 This beginning was
aborted by the War, but when activity began again in 1920 the denoue-
ment came rapidly.
The parallel movement of the ABA and the ALI towards the goal
of classification of the law might seem surprising in the light of the
hostility between the two organizations and the broader differences be-
tween the two aspects of the profession which they represented. The
meeting of the AALS which heard the speeches of Hohfeld and Beale
was the first to meet separately from the annual meeting of the ABA.
The split was occasioned, according to the law teachers, by the older
organization's slighting of both them and of legal education, symbol-
ized by the proximate cause of the break, the moving of the date of the
ABA's meeting from August to October, a time particularly unpropi-
tious for academics. 94
But the differences went deeper than a disagreement over a con-
venient time to meet. The men involved had different views on the
proper response to the questions raised by the changing circumstances
of American life. Beale, for example, was a thorough advocate of socio-
logical jurisprudence. He told his colleagues:
The vocation of our own age, then, is to restudy our law with a
view to its readjustment and reform .... We must examine the law
objectively to learn its social purpose and to see how far that pur-
pose is being accomplished. Such a study is the object of the new
sociological jurisprudence.95
Root, on the other hand, not only trusted in the gradual development of
the law to solve the current problems, but he even praised the bete noir
of the sociological jurist - freedom of contract - as the instrument of
the destruction of a society based on status. He further cautioned: "We
should not forget that every increase of governmental power to control
the conduct of life is to some extent a surrender of individual freedom
and a step backwards towards that social condition in which men's lives
are determined by status rather than by their own free will." 96 He was
93. Lewis, History of the American Law Institute and the First Restatement of
the Law: 'How We Did It', in I RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS 1-2 (1945).
94. Auerbach, supra note 18, at 567.
95. Beale, supra note 90, at 39.
96. Root, supra note 86, at 372.
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a believer in a theory of law which Pound had labelled an anachro-
nism.9 7 Nor did all teachers hold the same views. Harlan Stone, then
dean of the law school at Columbia, could attack the concept of social
justice as a basis for judicial decision and label sociological jurispru-
dence more a theory of legislation than of the judicial process and still
lament the profusion of judicial opinions and call for systematization. 8
On the whole, however, law teachers were far more inclined to
speak the rhetoric of Progressivism than were the practitioners who
concerned themselves with the issues of legal reform.99 Through their
advocacy of quintessential Progressive reform of the court system the
law teachers of the American Judicature Society would, in fact, come
into sharp conflict with certain elements of the organized bar.
The AJS was not the original proponent of reform of the organiza-
tion of the courts. Pound's 1906 speech had emphasized reorganization
of the courts as well as procedural reform, and one of the reports he
prepared for the Special Committee to Suggest Remedies contained a
detailed plan for the reform of state court organization centering on the
unification of the courts. Pound acknowledged, however, that since im-
plementation of such a plan would require action in each state, its sub-
mission to the ABA was really a propaganda device.'00 It was the
American Judicature Society which took up the cause as Pound had
outlined it.
The AJS, however, added one small innovation. The appointed
judges of the unified state court were to go before the electorate three,
nine, and eighteen years after appointment to allow the people to de-
cide whether they should be retained in office. Should a judge survive
all three tests he would continue in office until death, retirement, or
impeachment. This system was designed as a safe substitute for judicial
recall and as a form of popular selection of judges which would cause
the least damage to the quality of the bench.' 0°
97. Pound, Political and Economic Interpretations of Jurisprudence, 9 PROc.
AM. POL. Sci. ASS'N 94-105 (1912).
98. H. STONE, LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 40-49, 212-14 (1924); Stone, The
Lawyer and His Neighbors, 4 CORNELL L.Q. 185 (1919).
99. Auerbach, supra note 18, at 555-56.
100. Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws to
Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation, Report, 34 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A.
595 (1909).
101. First Draft of a State-Wide Judicature Act, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SocI-
ETY BULLETIN VII at 3-14 (1914); KALES, supra note 54, at 225-51; Kales, Methods of
Selecting and Retiring Judges, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY BULLETIN VI at 29-
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The arrangement resembled the judicial recall closely enough,
however, to call down the wrath of Rome Green Brown, chairman of
the ABA's special committee to oppose the judicial recall.102 Theodore
Roosevelt's inclusion in the New Nationalism of some sort of judicial
recall as a means to remedy decisions such as Lochner v. New York 1°3
drove the upper reaches of the American bar to distraction in a way no
political issue was to do again until another Roosevelt attempted to
pack the United States Supreme Court.10 Brown's committee was but
one manifestation of that exasperation which stemmed from a view of
American government and society which was probably widespread at
the elite levels of the bar. The most important feature of American
government in this view was the check of popular whims and passing
fancies exercised by the courts. It was also apparent that the fickle pop-
ulace was always attacking the security of property, making the courts
its greatest defender. Thus judicial recall was anathema. It would de-
stroy the only security the nation, or better, the propertied groups, had
against popular usurpation of authority.105
Brown was able to wring a compromise out of the AJS which pre-
served the elections but placed them at the end of fixed terms rather
than at points in a life tenure, thus saving them from the stigma of
being recall elections.106 The fatuousness of this resolution belies the
52 (1914).
102. Brown was a wealthy and conservative Minneapolis lawyer dedicated to the
fight "against judicial recall and other revolutionary and anti-constitutional doctrines
of socialism." In 1919 he resigned from the ABA because 1) the Executive Committee
refused to reimburse some of the expenses incurred in his crusade against socialism,
and 2) the ABA's 1919 annual meeting rejected a resolution passed by Brown's com-
mittee "condemning the revolutionary movement signified by the Red Flag of Social-
ism and urging a campaign of education in support of the government which is signified
by our Flag of the Stars and Stripes ...." Letter from Rome G. Brown to George T.
Page, President of the ABA, Minneapolis, September 4, 1919, copy in Paige Box 26,
Pound MSS, supra note 35; Botein, supra note 82, at 54-64.
103. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
104. G. MOWRY, THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT
215-18 (1947).
105. These generalizations are based on an examination of the political attitudes
of Adolph J. Rodenbeck, Everett P. Wheeler, Thomas W. Shelton, and Henry A. Fos-
ter, all prominent reformers of procedure.
The attitude described agrees with Arnold M. Paul's description of "neo-federal-
ism." See A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR
AND BENCH, 1887-1895 at 159-60, 233-35 (rev. ed. 1969).
106. Revised State-Wide Judicature Act, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY BUL-
LETIN VII-A at 170, 186 (1917).
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importance of the conflict. The injection of politics into what should
have been reform based on scientific ideas of efficient organization was
fatal. As Pound put it, "the real difficulty is that Kales, who drew the
plan, is an unusual Bull Moose and several of his associates are more or
less on the fringe of the Bull Moose herd. 10 7
Once its suggestions were seen as partisan, the projects of the AJS
could not command the support of other academics like Pound, let
alone of the profession at large. But Pound himself was the principal
exponent of sociological jurisprudence, a way of looking at law that not
only seems to have been the peculiar province of academics but also at
least implied a view of the issues of social justice different from that of
the practitioners, like Root, who supported freedom of contract.
Whatever the political tendency of Pound's rhetoric, however, the prac-
tice of sociological jurisprudence made it easy to gather all right think-
ing lawyers into the fold. In the end, sociological jurisprudence lacked
not only political content but in fact had little content of any kind.
Pound's grand idea had little life off the printed page.
Given the importance attached to legal education in Pound's work
and his position as dean of Harvard Law School from 1916, he might
have been expected to welcome expansion of the curriculum in a socio-
logical direction. Pound's practice of legal education at Harvard, how-
ever, was remarkably narrow. He found abhorent Wigmore's plan to
add a fourth year of legal study in which courses emphasizing the prac-
tical working of the law would be taught. Pound summed up his view in
a letter to Harlan Stone: "It has been the glory of the better law
schools in the country that they have stood resolutely for thorough
work - for doing a few of the things best [worth] doing as well as they
could, rather than for paper programmes attempting to cover every-
thing."108 Nor did he have any sympathy for clinical training or legal
aid work, although presumably it would have brought the student into
contact with some of the social forces which made a sociological juris-
107. Roscoe Pound to Rome G. Brown, Cambridge, March 23, 1915, Ms. Box 2,
Early Period Addenda, Pound MSS, supra note 35. Pound was a director of the AJS
but did not keep in close touch with its activities since they were centered in Chicago.
He did not see the controversial Bulletin VI before it was published. Roscoe Pound to
Rome G. Brown, Cambridge, March 23, 1915, Ms. Box 2, Early Period Addenda,
Pound MSS, supra note 35. Botein, supra note 82, at 60-62, has an interesting discus-
sion of the attitudes of some leaders of the ABA who opposed the judicial recall in the
name of judicial reform designed to separate courts from electoral politics.
108. Roscoe Pound to Harlan F. Stone, Cambridge, July 13, 1917, Paige Box 8,
Pound MSS, supra note 35.
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prudence necessary. 109 He was even opposed to separate courses in ju-
risprudence.11  Both would have distracted the student from profes-
sional training.
In truth, Pound's views do not seem to have advanced beyond
those of his predecessor, James Barr Ames, who was prepared in 1902
to lend Joseph Beale to the University of Chicago to be the first dean of
its new law school until he discovered that President William Rainey
Harper of Chicago intended to put on the faculty Ernst Freund, a pro-
fessor of political science and specialist in administrative law. Ames
wrote Harper that Beale would not go unless the new school was to be
"a School with a curriculum of pure law, with a Faculty made up ex-
clusively of professors, who are lawyers," and Beale himself said he
would refuse the position unless the school were to teach only "strictly
legal subjects" with a "faculty consisting only of lawyers. 11
The one attempt to put sociological jurisprudence into practice was
not made by Pound. Louis Brandeis was in full sympathy with Pound's
ideas.11 2 The famous "Brandeis brief" in Muller v. Oregon 13 - a few
pages of legal argument and hundreds of pages of hard data on the
adverse effects on women of long working hours - was truly sociologi-
cal jurisprudence in action and led the United States Supreme Court to
uphold the Oregon ten-hour law. 14 Brandeis went on to more success-
ful defenses of social legislation, primarily at the state level.115 As Mel-
109. Legal Aid, Roscoe Pound to Harlan F. Stone, Cambridge, February 26,
1916, Ms. Box 3, Early Period Addenda, Pound MSS, supra note 35.
110. Roscoe Pound to James Parker Hall, dean of the University of Chicago
Law School, Cambridge, November 27, 1916, Paige Box 8, Pound MSS, supra note
35.
111. Quoted in Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, 5
PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 438 n.56 (1971). On Pound's lack of innovation
in legal education see WIGDOR, supra note 65, at 223-24; on the narrowness of Lang-
dell's method see TWINING, supra note 3, at 13-14.
112. "As one of Brandeis's law secretaries [James M. Landis] has suggested,
Brandeis was living proof of the kind of jurist Pound was seeking . . . ." S. KONEFSKY,
THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS: A STUDY IN THE INFLUENCE OF IDEAS 92
(1956); Brandeis's statement of his views is in Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L.
REV. 461-71 (1916).
113. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
114. See A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 248-51 (1946); M. UROF-
SKY, A MIND OF ONE PIECE: BRANDEIS AND AMERICAN REFORM 39-42 (1971); P.
STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 114-31 (1984); the brief was
published by the National Consumers' League, Women in Industry.
115. A. MASON, supra note 114, at 251-53.
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vin Urofsky notes, however, "in practice, aside from Brandeis, few law-
yers had had great success with data-laden briefs."116 Perhaps the most
spectacular disappointment was Adkins v. Children's Hospital,"7 in
which the United States Supreme Court, unmoved by a massive Bran-
deis brief prepared by Felix Frankfurter, invalidated a statute setting a
minimum wage for women in the District of Columbia in the name of
"liberty of contract." 1 8
Surprisingly enough, when Pound was involved in defending the
Child Labor Act of 1916 before the federal district court for the West-
ern District of North Carolina he made no use of the Brandeis tech-
nique, but argued solely in traditional terms about the nature and ex-
tent of the federal commerce power." 9 When Pound was asked to
prepare a report on classification of the law for the new American Law
Institute in 1923 he produced "little more than ... a potted history of
various theories of classification, only to reject most of them in favor of
acceptance of the traditional categories of the common law. . . . [I]t
might well have been written by someone who had never heard of soci-
ological jurisprudence."' 20
What sociological jurisprudence came to mean, then, was not a
body of doctrine but an attitude or even a rhetoric which emphasized
the well-known ability of the common law to accomodate itself to the
times and which emphasized even more strongly the importance of
thorough training for the forming of good lawyers. As befits such a
blandly acceptable notion, the rhetoric of sociological jurisprudence ap-
peared more and more frequently. It can be seen in the works of promi-
nent New York practitioners like Henry W. Taft and Frederick Rene
Coudert.' 21 It even penetrated the discourse of Harlan Stone. "The en-
116. M. UROFSKY, supra note 114, at 145.
117. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
118. See F. FRANKFURTER, BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MIN-
IMUM WAGE CASE (1923); P. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES, 1918-
1969 at 56 (1972); F. FRANKFURTER & H. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES
103-04 (1960).
119. D. WIGDOR, supra note 65, at 195-98; S. WOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: CHILD LABOR AND THE LAW 101-05 (1968).
120. TWINING, supra note 3, at 24; see also Pound, Preliminary Report on Clas-
sification of the Law, 2 PROC. AM. L. INST. 318-25 (1924); Pound, Classification of
Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 381-425 (1924).
121. H. TAFT, LAW REFORM: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES BY A PRACTICING LAWYER
3 (1926); F. COUDERT, CERTAINTY AND JUSTICE: STUDIES OF CONFLICT BETWEEN PRE-
CEDENT AND PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT 36-37 (1913).
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tire history of our law" he wrote in 1919, only five years after he had
rejected the concept of social justice, "has been one of change and ad-
aptation to meet new conditions, social and economic, and to conform
to a more enlightened ethical perception.' 22 Stone doubted, however,
that sociological jurisprudence had "any methodology, any formulae, or
any principles which can be taught or expounded so as to make it a
guide whether to the student of law or to the judge" in the face of the
unordered, unscientific chaos of the American common law.' 23
These words of Stone are revealing. Belief in the need to classify
transcended differences, and the teachers, at least those in the schools
of the AALS, had a unique contribution to make to that endeavor.
They were the masters and advocates of the case method of teaching.
Whatever Christopher Columbus Langdell thought he was doing when
he started to teach at Harvard using opinions of the appellate courts as
the only classroom material, and whatever his successors eventually
made of his system, some believers in classification took the Dean at his
word when he spoke of the relatively few fundamental doctrines of the
law. Root stated the close relationship between the impulse to classify
and the case method quite clearly in his 1916 address to the ABA:
The living principle of the case system of instruction in our law
schools is that the student is required by a truly scientific method
of induction to extract the principle from the decision and to con-
tinually state and restate for himself a system of law evolved from
its history .... With a Bar subjected generally to that process of
instruction, the more general systematic study of jurisprudence
would follow naturally and inevitably, and the influence of that
study would be universal; and from that condition would evolve
naturally the systematic restatement of our law, by men equal to
that great work.12
122. Stone, The Lawyer and His Neighbors, 4 CORNELL L.Q. 185, 188 (1919);
see also Stone, The Significance of a Restatement of the Law, 10 PROc. ACAD. POL.
SCI. IN CITY OF N.Y. 6 (1923) (Law and Justice). On Stone's favorable attitude to
sociological jurisprudence see Stevens, supra note 111, at 427 n.28; A. MASON.
HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 114-20 (1968). Mason asserts that Stone's
Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification, 23 COLUm. L. REv. 319-37
(1923), indicates his full conversion to sociological jurisprudence from his critical posi-
tion evidenced in LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION, supra note 98.
123. Stone, Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification, 23 COLUM. L.
REV. 319, 327-28 (1923).
124. Root, supra note 86, at 366.
1116 [Vol. I11
The American Law Institute
Acceptance of the case method became a shibboleth dividing the
professional law teacher from the practitioner or judge whose part-
time teaching had been the backbone of what formal legal education
there had been in the United States; nevertheless, the case method's
intellectual premises were not necessarily opposed to those of "old fash-
ioned" members of the profession. In fact, early opposition to the case
method was based on the belief that it obscured principles and turned
students into mere "case lawyers."' 12 5 As the new legal scholarship be-
came more common with the growth of the full time professoriate and
of the law reviews in which they published, it no doubt became obvious
to at least some practitioners who cared about such things that the
analysis of cases involved the extractions of the very principles which
were at the heart of the conventional theory of law.
A project of classification could thus unite the elite practitioners
and the elite law teachers, the two most vocal and most prominent
parts of the profession, by emphasizing a shared view of what the law
was really all about.
America's entry into the First World War put an end to agitation
for legal reform on the part of the AALS and the ABA. Once the crisis
was over and the nation returned to "normalcy," classification
reemerged as almost the sole focus for reform. In part, classification
triumphed through a lack of competition. The one active form of socio-
logical jurisprudence received a severe set back in the Adkins'26 case,
and freedom of contract had a renaissance while the concept of socio-
logical jurisprudence itself was revealed more and more to be empty
rhetoric. 127 The AJS continued to peddle its model statutes, but more
quietly. The procedural reformers in the ABA began to lose some of
their energy as the leadership, especially Everett P. Wheeler, who had
been chairman of the Special Committee from the beginning, grew old.
125. For representative discussions see J. BISHOP, COMMON LAW AND CODIFICA-
TION, OR THE COMMON LAW AS A SYSTEM OF REASONING (1888); Schouler, Cases
Without Treatises, 23 AM. L. REV. 1 (1889); Dwight, Columbia College Law School,
New York, I GREEN BAG 141-60 (1889); S. DICKSON, THE METHODS OF LEGAL EDU-
CATION, AN ADDRESS TO THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 25
(1891); Penfield, Text Books vs. Leading Cases, 25 AM. L. REV. 234-38 (1891);
Phelps, Keener, Tiedeman, & Gray, Methods of Legal Education, 1 YALE L.J. 139
(1892); Wurts, Systems in Legal Education, 17 YALE L.J. 86-97 (1907); R. STEVENS,
LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1950S TO THE 1980s at 57-60
(1983).
126. 261 U.S. at 525.
127. P. MURPHY, supra note 118, at 63.
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The committee formed in response to Pound's 1906 speech became the
Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform and turned away from
grand procedural designs to small reforms of the substantive law. Sym-
bolic of the change, Pound himself was omitted from the committee in
1920, to his annoyance. 2 The bill granting the Supreme Court rule
making powers was still bottled up in the Senate Judiciary Committee
and its great supporter, Thomas Shelton, would spend the rest of his
life in a futile effort to dislodge it.' 29
The one type of reform to reemerge with vigor was classification.
The ABA committee came to life again in 1919, under James DeWitt
Andrews' leadership. By 1920 he was trying to revive the American
Academy of Jurisprudence as a vehicle for the creation of a restate-
ment of the law according to a scientific scheme of classification, and
that same year persuaded the ABA to pass a resolution ordering his
committee and the Executive Committee of the Association to cooper-
ate with any group working towards a restatement and classification of
the law. 30
Andrews almost got his way. The Executive Committee looked
with favor on his project, and at the annual meeting in 1922 he
presented a plan to finance the operation through a publishing company
whose initial capital would be supplied by individual subscriptions of
$800 to whatever series of books would be produced. The Executive
128. Roscoe Pound to J.F. Loughborough, Cambridge, December 23, 1920,
Paige Box 32, Pound MSS, supra note 35.
129. Successful Annual Meeting Crowns Year of Real Accomplishments, 18
A.B.A. J. 705, 760 (1932); Association's Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting is Marked by
Notable Features, 19 A.B.A. J. 553, 603 (1933).
After Shelton's death the Association discontinued his committee (1933). Ironi-
cally enough, before the decade was out the goal was reached and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were enacted, having been written by a committee appointed by the
Supreme Court under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934). Although
Congress ordered that the "rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substan-
tive rights of any litigant," their simplification of practice and procedure has almost
surely affected the doing of substantive justice in the federal courts. By changing the
test for the maintenance of a lawsuit from the statement of a cause of action, usually
defined by the traditional common law categories which in turn can be interpreted very
narrowly, to the statement of a claim on which relief can be granted, the rules have
probably encouraged the righting of many more wrongs than could have been handled
under the old system. For a striking and humorous example of this process see Di-
oguardi v. During, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
The links between progressive era procedural reform and the writing of the FRCP
have yet to be traced.
130. 45 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 82-87 (1920).
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Committee, however, reversed itself and recommended defeat of this
idea, presumably, as Andrews himself charged, because it looked with
greater favor on the recent activities of the AALS. 131
The law teachers had returned to the problem of classification and
restatement in 1920 and appointed a Committee on Juristic Center to
investigate the creation of a permanent body dedicated to the improve-
ment of the law. The Committee reported with enthusiasm in 1921 and
the Association resolved "to invite the appointment of similar commit-
tees representing the courts, the bar associations, the professional and
other scientific bodies engaged in the study of the substantive and ad-
jective law and its administration, for the purpose of jointly creating a
permanent organization for the improvement of the law."13 Three
months later, in March 1922, a member of the AALS committee, Wil-
liam Draper Lewis, dean of the law school at the University of Pennsyl-
vania, approached Elihu Root, "the leader of the American Bar," for
his support. It was forthcoming and on March 22, 1922, the AALS
committee and some distinguished practitioners met under Root's
chairmanship in New York City and formed the Committee on the Es-
tablishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the
Law. This group produced a lengthy diagnosis of the failings of Ameri-
can law and called the great meeting of February 23, 1923, which
failed to impress Mr. Justice Holmes but which accepted the report
and created the American Law Institute.233
The report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent
Organization focused on the uncertainty and complexity of American
law. No one could be blamed for this situation. The bench and bar
were the prisoners of a system which demanded the resolution of indi-
vidual cases and thus worked against any ordered development of the
law. Nevertheless, the defects constantly undermine respect for the law
and "disrespect for law is the corner-stone of revolution. 1 34 It would
not be impossible, however, to stave off the apocalypse:
The community possesses a force tending toward the certainty
of the law as well as its adaptation to the needs of life in proportion
as our judges and lawyers have that grasp of legal principles which
131. 47 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 84-96, 391-93 (1922).
132. HANDBOOK OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS AND PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE 19TH ANNUAL MEETING 116 (1921).
133. Lewis, supra note 93, at 2-3; 2 P. JEssUP, ELIHU ROOT 470-71 (1938).
134. Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Im-
provement of the Law, Report, 1 PROC. AM. L. INsT. 6-7, 68 (1923).
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enable them to see the real issues presented by the facts of a case,
and the skill to apply consistently the proper principles to its
solution.135
All that was needed was "constructive scientific work.' 13 6
Although other strains of legal reform had become moribund by
1920, the scientific classifying strain which triumphed in the ALI did
not succeed because of a total lack of competition. Alternatives were
expressed by persons who were at the very least not anathema to the
elite represented in the ABA and the AALS. The 1920 meeting of the
AALS which appointed the Committee on Juristic Center heard the
then president of the Association, Eugene A. Gilmore of the University
of Wisconsin, give an address in which he suggested three methods of
improving legal education and thus the law itself. 37 One was the crea-
tion of "a national seminar or institute of law" with a membership of
practitioners, judges, and teachers who would concern themselves with
wide-ranging problems. This suggestion was related to the ALI but the
other two certainly were not. One concerned a closer involvement of
law schools in legislative law making and the other advocated a closer
relationship between law schools and colleges and a smoothing of the
transition between the two by bringing the social sciences into the legal
curriculum and some law into the college. 18"
Neither of these suggestions had any real success, although there
was a legislative drafting bureau associated with Columbia University
in 1920.139 The Association's committee on curriculum retained a nar-
row view of legal education. Wigmore had to present his views on
widening the curriculum and lengthening the course of the study as a
minority report. 140
Another suggestion was made in 1921 by Benjamin Cardozo in his
article "A Ministry of Justice.' 14' Cardozo proposed to gather judges,
135. Id. at 74.
136. Id. at 35, 37.
137. Gilmore, Annual Address, in HANDBOOK OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERI-
CAN LAW SCHOOLS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SUMMER MEETING, AND OF THE EIGHT-
EENTH ANNUAL MEETING 150-51, 154-56 (1920) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
138. Id.
139. Harlan F. Stone to Roscoe Pound, New York City, December 13, 1920,
Ms. Box 33, folder 15, Pound MSS, supra note 35.
140. HANDBOOK, supra note 137.
141. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113 (1921).
Pound talked of a ministry of justice in 1917 before the Conference of Bar Associ-
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professors, and practitioners who would mediate between the legisla-
ture and the courts, pointing out which legal problems could be solved
by statutory enactments and which should be left to the courts. Car-
dozo himself, however, found the suggested law institute an even better
idea. He told the 1921 meeting of the AALS:
Well, this Academy, if we found it, will be able to cooperate with
the Ministries of Justice and may even render them superfluous. It
will supply the judges the ideals and the standards to which they
will increasingly repair to shape the law and change it within the
limits of judicial power.142
These failed alternatives have one thing in common - they did
not support professionalism as strongly as did the American Law Insti-
tute. Both the legislative drafting bureau and the ministry of justice
had a political function, and involvement in politics was the antithesis
of professionalism. Professionals were the masters of a neutral body of
scientific knowledge, but politicians were not. Broadering the law
school curriculum diluted those very claims to mastery of a useful body
of knowledge. It would also call into doubt lawyers' self-sufficiency and
autonomy, thus working a particular hardship on teachers who become
the masters of a difficult or incomplete discipline. The position of the
legal academic was of great importance because his existence testified
to the scientific worth of the discipline. Its proper study required an
academic class. The importance of the academic as opposed to the
mundane can be seen in the treatment received at the 1921 ABA con-
vention by the ALI's most direct competitor, Andrews' revived Ameri-
can Academy of Jurisprudence. It was strongly attacked in floor debate
because its commercial nature made it hopelessly unscientific and
unscholarly.143
ation Delegates. Pound, Anachronisms in Law, 3 J. AM. JUDICATURE L. Soc. 142
(1920). Having been informed by Felix Frankfurter of Cardozo's interest in the sub-
ject, Pound corresponded with the judge and made some bibliographic suggestions. Let-
ters from Roscoe Pound to Benjamin Cardozo, April 27, 1921, and May 25, 1921, both
from Cambridge and both in Paige Box 32, Pound MSS, supra note 35.
142. AALS HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGS 119 (1921).
143. Remarks of G. Wickersham, 47 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 90-91 (1921); see
also Letter from Roscoe Pound to James DeWitt Andrews, Cambridge, May 6, 1921,
Paige Box 32, Pound MSS, supra note 35.
Pound was suspicious of the Committee on Classification and Restatement of the
Law, writing to Harlan Stone that he had accepted a place on it only because of his
fear of "enthusiasts" and to enable himself "to sit on the lid." Pound to Stone, Cam-
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The founding rites of the ALI were permeated by the rhetoric of
professionalism. In the first place, the Report of the Committee to Es-
tablish a Permanent Organization insisted that the proposed organiza-
tion "should not promote or obstruct political, social or economic
changes" but should remain on the high plane of science, leaving for
the legislatures such questions as tax and fiscal policy, government ad-
ministrative policy, and "novel social legislation" like old age pensions
or methods for composing differences between capital and labor.14 4 An-
other familiar note was sounded when the Committee blamed "not a
little of the existing uncertainty in the law" on low educational require-
ments for admission to the bar and on the politicization of judicial of-
fice. 145 Finally, the report could not emphasize too strongly the legal
profession's "obligation to the American people to promote the cer-
tainty and simplicity of the law, and its adaptation to the needs of life,"
analogizing it to the "duty of the doctors of medicine to organize to
increase medical knowledge. '146
The ultimate glorification of the legal profession was saved for the
report's speculations on the future of the proposed restatement. An
early draft of the report expressed the hope that if the restatements
were done well enough then state legislatures would adopt the princi-
ples they contained as a "guide and aid to the Courts" having authority
equal to that of the decisions of the highest court of the state.117 This
hope was reduced to a speculation in the final draft. It was not of cur-
rent importance. "The important thing now is so to plan the work that
the restatement from its inception shall be recognized as a work of
great public importance for the execution of which the American legal
profession as represented by its leaders on the bench, in practice, and in
the schools, is responsible." 148 The goal has clearly become the exalta-
tion of the profession and the preservation of that leadership which
bridge, November 24, 1919, Ms. Box 4, folder 9, Early Period Addenda, Pound MSS,
supra note 35. See also Letter from Henry M. Bates, dean of the University of Michi-
gan Law School, to Roscoe Pound, Ann Arbor, December 3, 1920, Paige Box 11,
Pound MSS, supra note 35.
144. 1 PROC. AM. L. INST. 4-5, 15-16 (1923).
145. Id. at 74.
146. Id. at 29, 64-65.
147. The drafts of the Committee's report are gathered in a volume entitled
American Law Institute, Preliminary Reports, Etc., in the Harvard Law School
Library.
148. Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Im-
provement of the Law, Draft Report, 1 PROC. AM. L. INST. 24 (Part 1) (1922).
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Pound praised in his 1906 speech. As Elihu Root told the founding
meeting, their action "points the pathway where we will be acknowl-
edged the natural leaders of the democracy in its struggles towards bet-
ter life, towards permanency of institutions." 14 9
The concern with professionalization was not new, of course.
Throughout the period examined the question of the role of the expert
- the place of the self-proclaimed exponent of neutral science - had
been in question. Never before, however, had it been so prominent. The
successful establishment of the ALI in 1923 suggests a crisis of profes-
sionalism even more acute than that of the preceding two decades.
Pound for one judged the situation in terms recalling Holmes's com-
ments in "The Path of the Law."' 150 To a southern correspondent he
complained that "mammon has a fearful hold upon the bar north of
Mason and Dixon's Line."1 51 He also complained to Harlan Stone that
no one seemed willing to stand up to A. Mitchell Palmer and denounce
his illegal acts as Attorney General. "There was a time when the bar
would have taken this matter up vigorously as of course. Has the pro-
fession become so immersed in client-caretaking as to have forgotten its
duty to the law?"1 52
Granted that the Palmer Raids and the general suppression of civil
liberties were new elements, but they did not seem to rouse any great
number of lawyers.153 A more immediate threat to professionalism was
evident. The bar was being flooded by undesirables trained at third-rate
law schools, many of which were no better than cramming schools for
the bar exams and did nothing to instill their students with the spirit of
the profession.15 4
149. Remarks by E. Root, PROc. AM. L. INST. 55 (Part 2) (1922).
150. Holmes, supra note 15, at 201.
151. Pound to Charles A. Woods, Cambridge, December 23, 1920, Paige Box
32, Pound MSS, supra note 35.
152. Pound to Harlan Stone, Cambridge, February 5, 1921, Paige Box 32,
Pound MSS, supra note 35; see also WIGDOR, supra note 65, at 236-37.
Pound was one of the signers of a report to the American people on the illegal
practices of the Department of Justice. See FRANKFURTER & PHILLIPS, supra note 118,
at 173-74.
153. On the exuberant "patriotism" of the bar during and after the First World
War, see Auerbach, supra note 18, at 580-84.
154. Id. at 586-601. Much of what follows is based on Auerbach's article, al-
though the reader will note some differences in emphasis.
An interesting example of deference toward the law school can be seen in the
letters of Learned Hand to some of the members of the Harvard Law School faculty -
e.g., "To a judge of the first instance who spends most of his time in settling questions
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While lawyerly fears of undesirables, principally immigrants and
Jews, seems to be a staple of the American profession, after the First
World War they became more pronounced. 55 The ABA appointed a
committee on legal education chaired by Elihu Root to investigate the
problem, while Alfred Z. Reed undertook a similar study for the Car-
negie Foundation. Reed's report basically advocated the formalization
of the actual situation. There were two American bars which practiced
two very different kinds of law, and the divisions were along economic
and class lines. Reed was therefore willing to have the night, or part-
time schools train the lower bar, leaving the training of the upper bar
and the improvement of the law to the full-time schools of high
standard. 156
The Root committee totally rejected the idea of a divided bar but
accepted the part-time school provided it offered a course of as many
working hours as there were in the standard three-year full-time pro-
gram. It demanded, however, two years of collegiate education before
of fact, it [metaphysics and the larger questions involved in law] all seems pretty re-
mote, but we look to you in the school to reform us out of our traditionalism." Letter
from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., New York, March 30, 1921, Ms. Box
15, folder 26, Learned Hand Papers, Harvard Law School Library, Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts; see also Letter from Hand to Chafee, October 28, 1920, December 3, 1920,
March 26, 1924, all from New York City and all in Ms. Box 15, folder 26 of the Hand
Papers, also Hand to Joseph Beale, New York City, March 27, 1922, Ms. Box 13,
folder 13, Hand Papers, and Hand to Thomas Reed Powell, New York City, April 23,
1922, Ms. Box 35, folder 8, Hand Papers. I would like to thank Professor Gerald Gun-
ther for his kind permission to examine the Hand Papers.
For those who believed in the scholarly law school the statistics relating to legal
education must have been frightening. Of the six largest law schools during the 1919-
1920 school years, only one, Harvard, enrolling 883 students, required any college work
for admission. Of the other five (Georgetown, New York University, George Washing-
ton, Fordham, Suffolk), enrolling 4,061 students (16.58% of all law students), only two
had full-time programs and all five had part-time afternoon or night programs in the
same year 42.9% of the law students in the United States were enrolled in full-time
schools, and only 13.9% of the total were enrolled in schools requiring at least two
years of college work for admission. A. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION
OF THE LAW 452 (1921); A. REED, PRESENT-DAY LAW SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED
STATES 531, 532-35 (1928).
155. For an early example (1874) see IV A. NEVINS AND M. THOMAS, THE DI-
ARY OF GEORGE TEMPLETON STRONG 544 (1952): "This [requiring a college diploma
or an examination including Latin for admission in Columbia Law School] will keep
out the little scrubs (German Jew boys mostly) whom the School now promotes from
grocery counters in Avenue B to be 'gentlemen of the bar.'"
156. A. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 403-420
(1921); Auerbach, supra note 18, at 588-91.
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entering law school. It was the latter requirement that was seen by
opponents of the new guidelines as limiting access to the bar along eco-
nomic lines. 157 The AALS followed the Root committee's lead, rejected
the divided bar and agreed to accept part-time schools as members
while raising its entrance requirements over a number of years to two
years of college. The departure from settled policy regarding part-time
schools as members so infuriated Pound that he wrote to Harlan Stone,
suggesting that "Columbia and Harvard, and a few other institutions
which have consistently stood for what ought to be in legal education..
. pull out of this Association and let it run as an Association of second-
rate institutions."1 58 Pound's fulminations came to nothing, however,
and the net result was that the ABA and the AALS each gave a little
and patched up their differences as they slammed the door through
which came those who could never be properly professional lawyers.
The agreement between the ABA and the AALS on standards for
legal education and admission to the bar did not alter state laws gov-
erning admission in the slightest, but the significance of the agreement
should not be underrated. For once the upper levels of the profession,
at least, both practitioners and teachers, were speaking with one voice
on the subject of what made a good professional. At the same time they
both testified to the scientific nature of the law and their own great
sense of responsibility to the nation - and thus reaffirmed their right
to lead - through the American Law Institute. The legal profession
could at least face American society with a secure knowledge of its own
worth.1 59
Security, however, can be a fleeting thing. The treaty between the
practitioners and the teachers. did not work perfect reconciliation. The
resulting alliance carried within itself, as so many compromises do, the
seeds of its own destruction. Some law teachers, of course, like Pound,
were unhappy with any compromise of what they saw as high and nec-
essary standards, no matter how strongly required by the practicalities
of the situation. On the whole, however, the exclusionary intent of the
new rules for the legal education seem to have been widely sup-
157. Special Committee to the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar of the American Bar Association, Report, 46 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 667-88
(1921); Auerbach, supra note 18, at 593-98.
158. Roscoe Pound to Harlan F. Stone, Cambridge, January 2, 1923, Ms. Box
33, folder 15, Pound MSS, supra note 35.
159. Auerbach, supra note 18, at 599-601; Yeazell, supra note 44, at 43-45.
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ported. 160 It was the centerpiece of it all, the American Law Institute,
which was the weakest element.
The ALI at first glance was indeed the highest manifestation of
the idea of professionalism. Here were judges, teachers and practition-
ers drawn together in a self-perpetuating body charged with deciding
by vote the true principles of the science of law. These principles would
then be sent into the world to triumph by their own worth without be-
ing subjected to the corruption of the political process as practiced by
state legislatures. Indeed, the Institute had triumphed over competing
programs of reform at least in part because it did the most to remove
the legal professional from the defilement of partisan politics and place
it squarely with the experts. Yet the very basis for the entire undertak-
ing was an idea of law unchanged from the early nineteenth century,
an idea which underlay, so it seems, the thinking of both practitioner
and teacher. The Institute was a twentieth century bottle holding dis-
tinctly nineteenth century wine.
Almost at the very moment the ALI was being born Pound's intel-
lectual heirs were beginning to mount a real challenge to the view of
law which lay behind it. Legal realists had no place for ultimate princi-
ples revealed through the mere evidence of cases. No matter what di-
vided the teachers and practitioners who helped to found the ALI, their
intellectual histories were far more alike than different. What was com-
ing in legal education was different and would help to guarantee that
the profession of law would continue to question itself as the century
unfolded.
160. Auerbach, supra note 18, at 591-600.
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